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THE SANCTIFICATION ARGUMENT
FOR PURGATORY
David Vander Laan

A recently advanced argument for purgatory hinges on the need for complete
sanctification before one can enter heaven. The argument has a modal gap.
The gap can be exploited to fashion a competing account of how sanctifica
tion occurs in the afterlife according to which it is in part a heavenly process.
The competing account usefully complicates the overall case for purgatory
and raises questions about how the notion ought to be understood.

The Sanctification Argument
A number of scholars have recently argued that the notion of purgatory
should be taken seriously by all Christians, including Protestants, who
have typically followed the Reformers in dismissing the notion as an
extra-biblical teaching. Jerry Walls, in his recent book, Heaven: The Logic
o f Eternal Joy,1 has argued that the doctrine of purgatory is plausible for
Christians of all stripes, and that it is a natural development of the doc
trine of salvation.
This paper will address a similar argument developed independently
by Justin Barnard. I share Barnard's conviction that the case for purgatory
is worthy of exploration by Protestant Christians. However the argument
he offers, which I will call the 'sanctification argument for purgatory,' has
an interesting flaw—not a fatal flaw, but one that complicates the case for
purgatory in a way that illuminates the range of viable options.
First let's look at the argument, which has a two-part structure. The first
part is what Barnard calls the 'dilemma of sanctification.'2The saved, those
who have saving faith, are divided into two disjoint groups: the sanctified,
those of the saved whose settled state of character renders them incapable
of committing sinful acts,3 and the lapsable, those who lack such a settled
state of character. Heaven, the argument continues, is essentially morally
perfect. It is not possible (nomologically,4at the least) that anyone in heav
en sin. This is no problem for the sanctified, but what about the lapsable?
Since they are capable of sin, they must be excluded from heaven, even
though they are among the saved.
It appears, then, that either saving faith does not guarantee the heav
enly state after death, or else heaven is not essentially morally perfect.
This puzzle is the dilemma of sanctification.
The second part of the sanctification argument considers two prospec
tive solutions to the dilemma: purgatory and provisionism.5 Purgatory
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solves the puzzle by saying that through a process of spiritual purging
the lapsable can and will become members of the sanctified in the next
life, at which point they will enter heaven. Provisionism is the thesis that
God makes "unilateral provisions" for the complete sanctification of the
lapsable, so that they become members of the sanctified at death or im
mediately afterward.
The argument proceeds by process of diminution. A difficulty with provisionism is that there are reasons to doubt that instantaneous sanctifica
tion is something God would bring about, if indeed it is possible. If God
is willing and able to provide complete sanctification to the saved imme
diately after death, it is hard to see why God would not provide complete
sanctification to the saved before death. One reason, perhaps, is that it is
significantly better for free and fallen creatures to have a hand in their
own moral progress. This reason, however, supports the idea that such
creatures have a hand in their moral progress after death as well; in other
words, it supports purgatory over provisionism.6
This second part is the meat of the argument, and is the part likely to
draw the most controversy. One might contend, for example, that the
resemblance of the above argument against provisionism to some versions
of the evidential argument from evil7 renders the former vulnerable to re
cent criticisms of the latter. The considerations that call into question the
assumption that we would be able to see God's good reasons for permit
ting evil if there were such reasons (e.g., the limitations of our expertise
and the complexity of wise governance of human history) arguably under
mine the assumption that we would be able to see God's good reasons for
not completing the sanctification of the lapsable immediately after death if
there were such reasons. Barnard devotes much of his article to defense of
this stage of the argument.
However there is a modal flaw in the first part of the argument, the part
that concludes it is impossible for the lapsable to be in heaven, and it is this
part that is of present interest. After noting the gap in the logic, I will show
how one can take advantage of it to fashion an additional account of sancti
fication in the afterlife, one which makes sanctification a heavenly process.
The Modal Flaw
Here's the modal flaw. The claim is that from the moral perfection of heav
en and the definition of 'lapsable' it follows that the lapsable cannot be in
heaven. As Barnard puts it, "... the essential moral perfection of heaven is
such that it is not nomologically possible for sin or evil to be there. Since
the Lapsable are persons for whom sinful or evil actions are a nomological
possibility, no one in heaven is lapsable."8The reasoning seems to be this:
It is not possible that anyone sin in heaven.
It is possible that the lapsable sin.
Therefore, none of the lapsable are in heaven.9
This conclusion challenges us to explain how the lapsable can become
sanctified before entering heaven. (The notion of possibility Barnard uses
is a causal or nomological possibility, but what follows will apply equally
well to absolute possibility.)
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The argument above is invalid. Consider this parallel argument.
It is not possible that anyone stand while sitting.
It is possible for five-year-old children to stand.
Therefore, no five-year-old child is sitting.
Five-year-olds do sometimes sit. But both premises are true, so the argu
ment is invalid. We can see the problem easily enough: although it is pos
sible for five-year-olds to stand, they may fail to exercise that capacity
without ceasing to be five-year-olds. In particular, they may sit, and in that
way fail to exercise their capacity to stand.
The situation is similar in the case of the lapsable. They have the capac
ity to sin, but they may fail to exercise that capacity without ceasing to be
among the lapsable, that is, those whose character is not settled in a virtu
ous state. It follows from the premises that it is not possible for any of the
lapsable to sin in heaven, but it does not follow that the lapsable cannot be
in heaven. What's left open is the possibility that some of the lapsable be
in heaven but not sin for as long as they remain lapsable.
The Heavenly Sanctification Account
The upshot of this in the present context is that there is, at least in prin
ciple, a solution to the dilemma of sanctification other than those Barnard
considers. To explore this idea, let's construct a theological model that af
firms the moral perfection of heaven and places some of the lapsable in
heaven. I will call it 'the heavenly sanctification account.' The effect of the
account, loosely put, will be to move the locus of heaven's necessary sin
lessness from the stability of character its inhabitants enjoy to God's inten
tions for that state.
Unlike purgatory and provisionism, the heavenly sanctification account
says that those whose character does not yet preclude sin, the lapsable,
may nonetheless enter heaven, there to be further sanctified until the pro
cess is complete. A person like the "good thief" of the biblical crucifixion
accounts, for example, enters heaven despite an imperfect character. How
ever, God sees to it that he is not put in circumstances that result in his sin.
With God's guidance, he exercises his freedom and plays a significant role
in shaping his own character, as before death.
There are a number of ways we might develop this account to explain
how God prevents each person in heaven from sinning. One route is to situ
ate the account within a Molinist theory of divine providence, which in
cludes both libertarian freedom and non-determining divine control over its
exercise. Since on this view God knows by middle knowledge what any free
creature would do if placed in given circumstances, God could know that a
given person, though not perfectly virtuous, would not in fact sin in certain
heavenly circumstances. A person prone to lie about her past, say, would
be kept from the situations in which she would give in to this temptation.
Instead, she would be placed in situations such that the free acts she would
then perform helped to weaken and finally to eliminate her tendency to lie.
A growing knowledge of divine grace for specific sins of her past might
belong to the circumstances that enable her truthful behavior. The process
could be either fast or slow, depending on the particulars of the case.
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An alternative way of developing the account has it that God's knowl
edge of the saved person's dispositions and character (apart from any
middle knowledge) enables God to place her in circumstances that do not
lead to any sinful act. God would either steer her clear of any tempta
tion to which her dispositions leave her vulnerable or provide an overrid
ing grace to keep those dispositions from being active. Over time, in part
because of the saved person's own actions, the problematic dispositions
would dissolve. Here the locus of heaven's necessary sinlessness is again
God's governance.
On both variations, heavenly sin will be nomologically impossible if
God has sufficiently stable intentions to guide the lapsable clear of sinful
actions. Given the regular intentions by which God governs the universe,
the denizens of heaven will not sin. If, on the other hand, the very nature
of God's faithfulness ensures that those God has redeemed and brought
into heavenly communion with himself will remain in this communion,
then heavenly sin will be absolutely impossible. Either way, the account
includes the essential moral perfection of heaven, since, with a necessity
grounded either in the divine will or in divine goodness, God in love pro
tects each person in the heavenly state from sin.
There may be some question whether there are circumstances in which
a lapsable person would continue to act without sin and which lead ulti
mately to complete sanctification, but the burden here is on the objector.
The circumstances of heaven, no doubt, provide vastly more influence for
the good than the circumstances of this life. If heaven includes anything
like a vision of God's nature or an unparalleled presence of his Spirit, we
should expect even an imperfect human to be thoroughly motivated and
equipped to amend her faults.
Barnard distinguishes between satisfaction models and sanctification
models of purgatory.10 In satisfaction models, purgatory's function is to
allow people to make payment for their sins. In sanctification models,
purgatory's function is to allow people to participate in their continuing
moral and spiritual development. As Barnard observes, one important
advantage of a sanctification model is that it avoids the primary Protes
tant objection to purgatory, viz., that payment for sin comes solely by the
atoning work of Christ. It will be clear from the foregoing (if not from the
name) that the heavenly sanctification account shares this feature of sanc
tification models of purgatory.
Purgatorial Metaphors
The traditional teaching on the nature and function of purgatory has typi
cally included the torment of those being purged of their sin and the vivid
image of purifying flames.11 St. John Fisher's Exposition o f the Seven Peni
tential Psalms12 provides one historical example of an explicit comparison
between the pains of purgatory and hell. In his sermon on Psalm 6, Fisher
writes, "Truly, so great is the acerbity of the pains in that place that there
is no difference between the pains of hell and those of purgatory except
eternity" (11). St. John Vianney later expressed a similar view with the
language of fire.13
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The fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of Hell; the difference
between them is that the fire of Purgatory is not everlasting___Cruel
separation! To burn in the fire kindled by the justice of God! ... To be
devoured by regret, knowing that we could so easily have avoided
such sorrows!14
Barnard, in contrast, borrows from C. S. Lewis the less hellish images of a
painful washing and of a biting dental rinse.
Like Barnard's model, the heavenly sanctification account is suited to
rather different imagery than that of Fisher and Vianney. Because both tra
ditional thinking and all other thinking about the afterlife has been deeply
shaped by imaginative depictions, it will be worthwhile to reflect on how
the imagination may engage the heavenly sanctification account.
Consider, then, the description of the new Jerusalem15 at Revelation
22:2. It includes the tree of life, "bearing twelve crops of fruit, yielding its
fruit every month. And the leaves of the tree are for the healing of the na
tions." The image suggests an ongoing healing process. If we construe this
as a spiritual process, it would be natural to suppose that it involves im
proving states of character—the melting away of the bitterness of a family
dispute that's been passed down like an heirloom, the transformation of a
plodding faith into an energetic love for God, and so on.
Consider also the imagery of Rev. 7:17 (the last clause of which is re
peated at 21:4 and is reminiscent of Is. 25:8): "For the Lamb at the center
of the throne will be their shepherd; he will lead them to springs of liv
ing water. And God will wipe away every tear from their eyes." 'Their'
and 'them' refer to the great multitude in white robes standing before the
throne of God; the scene is in heaven. The actions of God and the Lamb
may be associated with sanctification: the leading to springs of living wa
ter is suggestive of the sanctifying Holy Spirit (cf. John 4:10, 13), and the
wiping away of tears perhaps includes removal of the sorrow-producing
effects of sin. (The Isaiah passage adds, "He will remove the disgrace of
his people from all the earth.") Both of these are depicted as processes,
even if brief ones. My suggestion is that there is powerful biblical imagery
of healing in God's presence in heaven, and that this suits the heavenly
sanctification account precisely.
Objection: The Pain of Regret
Naturally these images of heaven do not involve torment or separation
from God. One might object, though, that another kind of pain is inevita
ble if the heavenly sanctification account is true—not the pain of "knowing
that we could so easily have avoided such sorrows" but of mourning one's
past sins. On the face of it, all pain is ruled out: "There will be no more
death or mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed
away" (Rev. 21:4). If regret is unavoidable in coming to recognize the ex
tent of one's sin, it seems it cannot be a recognition that occurs in heaven.
Let me suggest two possible replies. We might take this last passage as
a strictly accurate characterization of heaven after its initial phase and a
generally accurate characterization of heaven as a whole. What the book of
Revelation gives us, after all, is a picture, not a list of individually necessary
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and jointly sufficient conditions. Perhaps at the outset the pain of regret,
though present, is overwhelmed by the joy of grace and reconciliation.
Alternatively, we could make use of a distinction from City o f God.
Augustine writes,
Thus, knowledge of evil is of two kinds: one in which it is accessible
to apprehension by the mind, the other in which it is a matter of di
rect experience. . . . There are two corresponding ways of forgetting
evil. The learned scholar's way of forgetting is different from that of
one who has experienced suffering. The scholar forgets by neglect
ing his studies; the sufferer, by escaping from his misery. The saints
will have no sensible recollection of past evils; theirs will be the sec
ond kind of forgetfulness by which they will be set free from them
all, and they will be completely erased from their feelings.16
Agreeing with Augustine, we might either say that regret is no part of
the saints' recollection of sin, or else distinguish between two kinds of re
gret, one of which involves pain, the other of which is simply a judgment
about one's w rongdoing-pain having been supplanted by gratitude for
the present healing of one's spirit.
Objection: Sinfulness and the Presence of God
It is evident that the heavenly sanctification account does not enjoy the tra
ditional status of either the purgatorial or the provisionist view. One pos
sible motivating reason suggested by Barnard's discussion is that nothing
sinful can be in the dwelling place or presence of God. If to be in heaven is
to be in God's presence, the imperfectly sanctified must be excluded.
What do we mean by 'presence' here? Barnard refers to heaven as a
place only for the sake of convenience, but suppose we do think of pres
ence as a spatial location. Then we will probably want to say that God's
presence is all-inclusive, i.e., that God is omnipresent. (As David asks in
Psalm 139, "Where can I flee from your presence?") Or we might prefer
to be sophisticated and say that although God's power and knowledge
extend to all places, God does not, properly speaking, have location at all,
so that no place is God's presence. In any case, the simplistic picture of a
special region (in the sky?) where God is located loses its appeal on very
little reflection.
If it's not a spatial location we have in mind, then perhaps God's pres
ence is to be thought of as a kind of spiritual communion, a relationship
of love and delight. In this case presence is the sort of thing that comes in
degrees. That's a bit awkward if we are thinking of heaven as God's pres
ence, since we don't normally think of heaven as coming in degrees (even
if some things come in degrees in heaven17). It's also in tension with the
assumption that nothing sinful can be in God's presence, since even sinful
humans can have a measure of communion with God. Indeed, we might
see the doctrine of the Incarnation as the doctrine that God is present with
sinners in a very strong sense.
These problems might be avoided by identifying heaven not with God's
presence per se but with some particular kind or degree of communion
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with God. Such an identification would be consistent with a view that dif
fered from the heavenly sanctification account only in name, one which
allowed purgatory to take the role that heaven's initial segment does on
the heavenly sanctification account. Purgatory could involve even experi
ences of theophany, revelation, and shared community with the perfectly
sanctified (i.e., with those in heaven) rather than separation from God and
the sanctified. The difference between a view like this and the heavenly
sanctification account is merely semantic.
Conclusion
The sanctification model of purgatory gets much of its appeal from the val
ue of free self-direction of character. It is a gift to be able to play a nontrivi
al role in one's own spiritual development. In granting this gift, God treats
human beings with an adult dignity. The problem of evil may give theists
a reason to affirm the value of the exercise of freedom; if so, the sanctifica
tion model of purgatory receives some support from that debate.
This is relevant in assessing the heavenly sanctification account. Both
the sanctification model of purgatory and the heavenly sanctification ac
count involve free postmortem action that contributes to the agent's moral
development. To the extent that the value of the free self-direction of one's
character supports the case for purgatory, it also supports the heavenly
sanctification account. In fact, the latter also has three other virtues Bar
nard claims for the sanctification model: it solves the dilemma of sanctifi
cation, preserves the integrity of the process of sanctification, and avoids
undermining the sufficiency of Christ's work as a satisfaction for sin.
Further, the heavenly sanctification account has advantages over pur
gatory. It quite naturally fits the biblical picture in which heaven and hell
are the only salient afterlife destinations, and it avoids the suggestion that
God is not present to the departed (cf. Paul's desire to be with Christ in
Phil. 1:23-24).
So on the criteria Barnard identifies, the heavenly sanctification account
is a serious competitor with the purgatorial view. No doubt still other ac
counts of postmortem sanctification could be developed. A hybrid of provisionism and the heavenly sanctification account, for example, would al
low a partial, miraculous gift of sanctifying grace at death, followed by a
completing process of sanctification in heaven. The point, in any case, is
that there are other solutions to Barnard's dilemma of sanctification than
two he considers, and so the sanctification argument for purgatory as a
whole is somewhat more complex than it might at first appear.
On the other hand, as noted, versions of the sanctification model of pur
gatory and the heavenly sanctification account are similar enough that the
distinction between heaven and purgatory can become a bit blurred.18The
way in which 'heaven' and 'purgatory' are defined naturally makes a big
difference to whether the heavenly sanctification account will be classified
as above, or as an unusually sunny picture of purgatory.
Whatever we may call it, the heavenly sanctification account preserves
the free spiritual development of purgatory, but replaces the purifying
flame with the medicinal leaves of the tree of life, which are "for the heal
ing of the nations." The account is, I suggest, a viable alternative to a pur
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gatorial view, and one which shares its chief advantages. At this stage of
the dialogue, there remain several competing responses to the dilemma of
sanctification that deserve serious consideration.19
Westmont College

NOTES
1. Oxford, 2002.
2. “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification," this journal.
3. Note that 'the sanctified' refers to the completely sanctified. This usage
isn't meant to imply that lapsable have not begun a process of sanctification.
On the contrary, the lapsable are among the saved, so the Holy Spirit has be
gun this process in them.
4. What Barnard has in mind is a necessity that involves law-like connec
tions (e.g., between creature's characters and the absence of sin in heaven), not
necessarily a necessity of physical laws.
5. Barnard passes over a third solution, viz., perfectionism, the thesis that
the lapsable can progress to become members of the sanctified in this life, and
so enter heaven immediately upon death. The difficulty with perfectionism is
that it is not at all likely that all of the saved are perfected in this life. Wesley,
for example, thought that only very few people are perfected in this life, and
this is borne out by observation.
6. Barnard also considers an argument that personal identity could not
be preserved through provisionism's instantaneous postmortem perfection.
7. Going a bit further, Barnard says this argument against provisionism
itself is a species of the evidential argument from evil. See the end of section 4,
“Solving the Dilemma of Sanctification: The Problem(s) with Provisionism."
8. See the end of section 3 of Barnard's paper, “Protestant Soteriology and
the Dilemma of Sanctification."
9. Cf. Barnard's statement: “Interestingly, the essential moral perfection
of heaven does entail that no one possessing saving faith attains or occupies
heaven as someone who is lapsable."
10. See section 5, “Purgatory: Two Models."
11. We might note that the image is a biblical one. “But who can endure
the day of his coming? Who can stand when he appears? For he will be like a
refiner's fire or a launderer's soap. He will sit as a refiner and purifier of silver;
he will purify the Levites and refine them like gold and silver" (Mal. 3: 2-3a).
Fire is also mentioned in I Cor. 3:15 and I Pet. 1:7, which The Catechism of the
Catholic Church (2nd ed., Doubleday, 2003) cites in connection with purgatory.
12. Trans. Helen Barbeau Gardiner. San Francisco: Ignatius Press. Thanks
to Chad Engbers for calling my attention to these sermons.
13. Vianney (d. 1859) was a French priest who became widely known as a
confessor and spiritual director.
14. “Sermon on Purgatory,"http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/stj18004
.htm.
15. Note that the identification of the new Jerusalem with heaven can easily
be challenged. Robert Gundry, for one, has proposed that it be identified with
God's redeemed people. See his The Old is Better: New Testament Essays in Sup
port o f Traditional Interpretations (Tuebingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), in the series
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament. Still, the city is associ
ated with God's presence (22:3, 22:3). See also Richard Bauckham's excellent
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The Theology o f the Book of Revelation (Cambridge, 1993), in which the new Jeru
salem is considered as place, people, and divine presence.
16. Book XXII, chap. 30.
17. Cf. Lewis: “[E]ven in Heaven some perpetual increase of beatitude,
reached by a continually more ecstatic self-surrender, without the possibility
of failure but not perhaps without its own ardours and exertions—for delight
also has its severities and steep ascents, as lovers know—might be supposed"
(Letters to Malcolm, 108).
18. Peter Kreeft, through his C. S. Lewis character, has suggested that
purgatory is the first part of heaven, a preparation for “deep heaven." See
Between Heaven and Hell, InterVarsity Press, 1982, 21, and Everything You Ever
Wanted To Know about Heaven . .. But Never Dreamed o f Asking, Harper & Row,
1982, 21.
19. Let me express my gratitude to Justin Barnard for his willingness to
discuss these issues and for generously sharing his own work in progress.
Thanks also to Chris Callaway, Jim Taylor, Ray Van Arragon and the editor of
Faith & Philosophy for helpful comments and to Tony Anderson, William Lane
Craig, Mark McLeod-Harrison, Richard Swinburne, and others for feedback
at the 2004 Pacific Division meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers.

